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The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of the presence of independent directors on 
boards of directors. Based on the agency theory, we study the different factors influencing the 
nomination of independent directors. The tests were applied to a sample of 71 companies 
belonging to Bursa Malaysia Main Market from 2007 to 2009. Using an OLS data regression 
framework, the findings show that the, coalition control, leverage and CEO tenure determine the 
independence of the board from the management. The result indicated that when the part of 
capital represented on the board and held by the coalition of control is low, the presence of 
independent directors is more important. The presence of the independent directors is 
significantly and positively determined by the level of debt and CEO tenure. However, we do not 
find evidence of the influence of the ownership structure, Company size and CEO Duality. 
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1.0      INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter one discusses the content of the research outline. It provides the bases of this current 
research. This chapter explains the fundamental of the research containing of the background, the 
development of Malaysian corporate governance, problem statement, research objectives and 
questions, significance, scope, definition of terms. The summary of the chapter is given at the end 
of the chapter.   
 
1.2 BACKGROUND    
Corporate governance has been a vital framework of rules and practices that determine corporate 
direction and performance. This issue of ensuring effective corporate governance has become a 
well-known discussion in the developed countries and as well as developing countries. Usually, 
the development of the corporate governance literature has highlighted a firm of having good 
corporate governance by considering an institution or management team that can affect the firm 
performance in the organization.  This has been well agreed from previous studies carried out in 
both developed countries like the US and the UK, and also in developing countries like Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand and Taiwan.  
 
The contents of 
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Descriptive Statistics (2007) 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
PINDEP .399585 .1154041 71 
INSTIT .607214 .2111561 71 
COALITION .250024794694 .2921970830739 71 
LEV .827143370155 .7687297139793 71 
TENURE 7.83 7.089 71 
LOGSIZE 7.192359939 1.2835947992 71 
DUALITY .14 .350 71 
 
Descriptive Statistics (2008) 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
PINDEP .423789 .1306421 71 
INSTIT .610908 .2170536 71 
COALITION .284907887882 .3997297402354 71 
LEV .793497577872 .6447837627104 71 
TENURE 8.82 7.102 71 
LOGSIZE 7.061131606 1.4912123689 71 
DUALITY  .15 .364 71 
Descriptive Statistics (2009) 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
PINDEP .425444 .1157116 71 
INSTIT .610976 .2240534 71 
COALITION .259795420589 .3159927985146 71 
LEV .779234794939 .7105991178918 71 
TENURE 9.77 7.148 71 
LOGSIZE 7.163345914 1.3069519321 71 





















Descriptive Statistics (Pool Data) 
 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
PINDEP .416273 .1208067 213 
INSTIT .609699 .2164638 213 
COALITION .264909367721 .3378413309553 213 
LEV .799958580989 .7067761886142 213 
TENURE 8.81 7.124 213 
LOGSIZE 7.138945820 1.3584752790 213 































ON LEV TENURE LOGSIZE DUALITY 
PINDEP Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.023 -.012 .143 .027 .015 -.036 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .425 .469 .117 .411 .452 .382 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
INSTIT Pearson 
Correlation 
-.023 1 -.011 .012 .064 -.332
**
 .058 
Sig. (1-tailed) .425  .000 .460 .297 .002 .315 










Sig. (1-tailed) .469 .000  .087 .037 .041 .409 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
LEV Pearson 
Correlation 
.143 .012 -.163 1 -.030 -.077 -.059 
Sig. (1-tailed) .117 .460 .087  .401 .261 .311 





 -.030 1 .151 .188 
Sig. (1-tailed) .411 .297 .037 .401  .105 .058 







 -.077 .151 1 .154 
Sig. (1-tailed) .452 .002 .041 .261 .105  .099 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
DUALITY  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.036 .058 -.028 -.059 .188 .154 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .382 .315 .409 .311 .058 .099  
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
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  0.23 0.239 0.219 0.125 0.372 0.004 









0.23   0.003 0.45 0.316 0.004 0.438 




-0.011 -.012 1 -0.194 0.094 0.073 -0.081 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
0.239 0.003   0.053 0.217 0.271 0.25 




0.094 -0.015 -0.194 1 -0.136 -0.036 -0.038 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
0.219 0.45 0.053   0.129 0.382 0.376 




0.138 0.058 0.094 -0.136 1 0.165 0.144 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
0.125 0.316 0.217 0.129   0.084 0.116 






 0.073 -0.036 0.165 1 0.013 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
0.372 0.004 0.271 0.382 0.084   0.456 






 0.019 -0.081 -0.038 0.144 0.013 1 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
0.004 0.438 0.25 0.376 0.116 0.456   
















PINDEP INSTIT COALITION LEV TENURE LOGSIZE DUALITY 
PINDEP Pearson Correlation 1 -.060 -.012 .258
*
 .126 .166 .145 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .311 .319 .015 .148 .083 .113 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
INSTIT Pearson Correlation -.060 1 -.011 .007 .076 -.298
**
 .013 
Sig. (1-tailed) .311  .007 .477 .263 .006 .456 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
COALITIO
N 
Pearson Correlation -.012 -.011 1 -.126 .298
**
 .060 .000 
Sig. (1-tailed) .319 .007  .148 .006 .310 .499 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
LEV Pearson Correlation .258
*
 .007 -.126 1 -.181 -.094 .018 
Sig. (1-tailed) .015 .477 .148  .066 .218 .442 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
TENURE Pearson Correlation .126 .076 .298
**
 -.181 1 .151 .099 
Sig. (1-tailed) .148 .263 .006 .066  .104 .206 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
LOGSIZE Pearson Correlation .166 -.298
**
 .060 -.094 .151 1 .194 
Sig. (1-tailed) .083 .006 .310 .218 .104  .052 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
DUALITY  Pearson Correlation .145 .013 .000 .018 .099 .194 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .113 .456 .499 .442 .206 .052  




   
CORRELATION 
APPENDIX B4 (POOL DATA) 




1 0.006 -.010 .159
*





  0.464 0.245 0.01 0.059 0.163 0.014 










0.464   0 0.49 0.166 0 0.335 








 0.104 -0.039 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
0.245 0   0.01 0.003 0.066 0.284 










 -0.068 -0.027 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
0.01 0.49 0.01   0.047 0.162 0.348 















0.059 0.166 0.003 0.047   0.012 0.017 
















0.163 0 0.066 0.162 0.012   0.047 
















0.014 0.335 0.284 0.348 0.017 0.047   



















a. All requested variables entered. 










Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .285
a
 .434 -.375 .1166117 
a.  Predictors: (Constant),  Institutional, Coalition, Leverage, LogSize, Tenure, Duality 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .076 7 .011 .024 .595
a
 
Residual .857 63 .014   
Total .932 70    
a. Predictors: (Constant), INSTIT ,COALITION, LEV, LOGSIZE, TENURE, DUALITY  
b. Dependent Variable: PINDEP  
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Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 0.496 0.129   3.837 0     
INSTIT -0.002 0.077 -0.003 -0.02 0.984 0.738 1.355 
COALITION -0.011 0.055 0.018 -1.73 0.011 0.759 1.317 
LEV 0.02 0.019 0.134 1.089 0.28 0.96 1.041 
TENURE 0 0.002 0.016 0.126 0.9 0.873 1.146 
LOGSIZE 0.001 0.012 0.006 0.049 0.961 0.832 1.202 
DUALITY -0.036 0.043 -0.108 
-
0.829 
0.41 0.859 1.164 









(Constant) INSTIT COALITION LEV TENURE LOGSIZE DUALITY 
1 
1 5.647 1 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 
2 0.868 2.55 0 0 0 0.02 0.01 0 0.77 
3 0.654 2.939 0 0.01 0.42 0.17 0.04 0 0.01 
4 0.362 3.948 0 0.02 0.27 0.53 0.2 0 0.07 
5 0.341 4.069 0 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.7 0 0.03 
6 0.076 8.614 0 0.65 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.06 0 
7 0.008 26.204 0.98 0.3 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.72 0 








 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .317228 .464801 .399585 .0328582 71 
Residual -.2472435 .3641930 .0000000 .1106275 71 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
-2.506 1.985 .000 1.000 71 
Std. Residual -2.120 3.123 .000 .949 71 





















a. All requested variables entered. 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .430
a
 .393 .349 .1242983 
a. Predictors: (Constant), INSTIT,COALITION,LEV,LOGSIZE,TENURE,LOGSIZE,TENURE, DUALITY 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .221 7 .032 2.047 .063
a
 
Residual .973 63 .015   
Total 1.195 70    
a. Predictors: (Constant),  INSTIT,COALITION,LEV,LOGSIZE,TENURE,LOGSIZE,TENURE, DUALITY 
b. Dependent Variable: PINDEP 
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Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 0.496 0.129   3.837 0     
INSTIT -0.002 0.077 -0.003 -0.02 0.984 0.738 1.355 
COALITION -0.011 0.055 0.018 -1.73 0.011 0.759 1.317 
LEV 0.02 0.019 0.134 1.089 0.28 0.96 1.041 
TENURE 0 0.002 0.016 0.126 0.9 0.873 1.146 
LOGSIZE 0.001 0.012 0.006 0.049 0.961 0.832 1.202 
DUALITY -0.036 0.043 -0.108 -0.829 0.41 0.859 1.164 
a.  Dependent Variable: PINDE 
       




   




(Constant) INSTIT COALITION LEV TENURE LOGSIZE DUALITY 
1 
1 5.653 1 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 
2 0.862 2.561 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 
3 0.693 2.855 0 0 0.52 0.1 0.01 0 0.075 
4 0.392 3.799 0 0 0.16 0.32 0.44 0 0.07 
5 0.256 4.703 0 0.04 0.01 0.5 0.5 0 0.08 
6 0.093 7.782 0 0.57 0.12 0.03 0 0.1 0 
7 0.01 23.819 0.99 0.33 0.1 0.03 0 0.55 0.05 
a. Dependent Variable: PINDEP 







 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .317228 .464801 .399585 .0328582 71 
Residual -.2472435 .3641930 .0000000 .1106275 71 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
-2.506 1.985 .000 1.000 71 
Std. Residual -2.120 3.123 .000 .949 71 
















a. All requested variables entered. 





Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .511
a
 .431 .370 .1048757 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Duality, Coalition, Leverage, LogSize, Tenure, Institutional 











Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .244 7 .035 .025 .006
a
 
Residual .693 63 .011   
Total .937 70    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Duality, Coalition, Leverage, LogSize, Tenure, Institutional 











  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted 
Value 
0.273565 0.592229 0.425444 0.059077 71 




-2.571 2.823 0 1 71 
Std. Residual -2.506 2.972 0 0.949 71 
a. Dependent Variable: PINDEP 
 
 















Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 0.51 0.118   4.32 0     
INSTIT -0.027 0.063 -0.053 -0.434 0.665 0.788 1.269 
COALITION -0.016 0.044 -0.1 -1.93 0.01 0.801 1.249 
LEV 0.042 0.018 0.258 2.32 0.024 0.946 1.057 
TENURE 0.003 0.002 0.175 1.471 0.146 0.827 1.21 
LOGSIZE 0.008 0.011 0.092 0.771 0.443 0.825 1.213 
DUALITY 0 0.035 0.001 0.01 0.992 0.884 1.131 
a. Dependent Variable: PINDEP 




   








1 5.758 1 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 
2 0.813 2.662 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.85 
3 0.662 2.95 0 0.01 0.41 0.18 0.04 0 0 
4 0.399 3.798 0 0.02 0.3 0.53 0.08 0 0.01 
5 0.228 5.022 0 0.01 0.07 0.22 0.82 0 0.01 
6 0.091 7.948 0 0.67 0.15 0 0.01 0.07 0 
7 0.008 26.785 0.99 0.25 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.72 0 
a. Dependent Variable: PINDEP 









Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .368
a
 .41 .37 .1142136 
a. Predictors: (Constant), INSTIT,COALITION,LEV,TENURE,LOGSIZE, DUALITY 





Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .420 7 .060 .024 .000
a
 
Residual 2.674 205 .013   
Total 3.094 212    
a. Predictors: (Constant), INSTIT,CAOLITION,LEV,TENURE,LOGSIZE, DUALITY 







Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Duality, Leverage, Institutional, 
Tenure, LogSize, Coalition 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: PINDEP 
109 
 









Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 0.5 0.071   7.056 0     
INSTIT 0.001 0.041 0.002 0.021 0.984 0.782 1.279 
COALITION -0.04 0.026 -0.059 -2.89 0.012 0.821 1.218 
LEV 0.027 0.011 0.159 2.404 0.017 0.96 1.042 
TENURE 0.002 0.001 0.101 1.461 0.146 0.89 1.123 
LOGSIZE 0.003 0.006 0.036 0.52 0.604 0.856 1.168 
DUALITY 0.018 0.023 0.053 0.774 0.44 0.889 1.124 
a. Dependent Variable: PINDEP 
       




   




(Constant) INSTIT COALITION LEV TENURE LOGSIZE DUALITY 
1 
1 5.673 1 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 
2 0.843 2.595 0 0 0.02 0.01 0 0 0.82 
3 0.676 2.897 0 0.01 0.49 0.14 0.03 0 0.01 
4 0.389 3.82 0 0.01 0.26 0.46 0.25 0 0.05 
5 0.279 4.506 0 0.02 0 0.33 0.68 0 0.02 
6 0.088 8.008 0 0.63 0.16 0.01 0 0.08 0 
7 0.009 25.185 0.99 0.3 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.66 0.01 












 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .300066 .553122 .416273 .0444997 213 
Residual -.3120472 .3567866 .0000000 .1123122 213 
Std. Predicted Value -2.611 3.075 .000 1.000 213 
Std. Residual -2.732 3.124 .000 .983 213 




LIST OF COMPANIES 
No: Name 
1 AMTEK HOLDINGS BERHAD 
2 APEX HEALTHCARE BERHAD 
3 APOLLO FOOD HOLDINGS BERHAD 
4 APP INDUSTRIES BERHAD 
5 ASIA FILE CORPORATION BHD 
6 BIOSIS GROUP BERHAD 
7 BONIA CORPORATION BERHAD 
8 CAB CAKARAN CORPORATION BERHAD 
9 HING YIAP KNITTING INDUSTRIES BERHAD 
10 JOHN MASTER INDUSTRIES BERHAD 
11 ORIENTAL FOOD INDUSTRIES 
12 PADIBERAS NASIONAL BERHAD 
13 PAN MALAYSIA CORPORATION BERHAD 
14 PANASONIC MANUFACTURING MALAYSIA BHD 
15 PARAGON UNION BERHAD 
16 PELIKAN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION BERHAD 
17 POH HUAT RESOURCES HOLDINGS BERHAD 
18 POH KONG HOLDINGS BERHAD 
19 PROLEXUS BERHAD 
20 REX INDUSTRY BERHAD 
21 SERN KOU RESOURCES BERHAD 
22 SHH RESOURCES HOLDINGS BERHAD 
23 SIN HENG CHAN (MALAYA) BERHAD 
24 SPRITZER BERHAD 
25 SYF RESOURCES BERHAD 
26 TAFI INDUSTRIES BERHAD 
27 TAKASO RESOURCES BERHAD 
28 TAN CHONG MOTOR HOLDINGS BERHAD 
29 TEO GUAN LEE CORPORATION BERHAD 
30 TPC PLUS BERHAD 
31 UPA CORPORATION BHD 
32 XIAN LENG HOLDINGS BERHAD 
33 YEE LEE CORPORATION BHD 
34 YEN GLOBAL BERHAD 
35 BRITISH AMERICAN TUBACO 
36 CARLSBERG COMPANY 
37 DUTCH LADY BERHAD 
38 AMWAY (MALAYSIA) 
39 NESTLE MALAYSIA BERHAD 


























41 UMW HOLDINGS BERHAD 
42 ZHULIAN BERHAD 
43 JT INTERNATIONAL BERHAD 
44 CHOO BEE METALINDUSTRIES BERHAD 
45 FRASER & NEAVE HOLDINGS BHD 
46 ECO WORLD DEVELOPMENT GROUP BHD (ECW) 
47 HUNZA PROPERTIES BERHA 
48 IGB BERHAD 
49 IJM LAND BERHAD (IJMLD) 
50 IOI PROPERTY BERHAD 
51 KUMPULAN EUROPLUS BHD (KEUR) 
52 LIEN HOE CORP BERHAD (LHC) 
53 KAWAN FOOD BERHAD 
54 KBB RESOURCES BERHAD 
56 KHEE SAN BERHAD 
57 LEE SWEE KIAT GROUP BERHAD 
58 FORMOSA PROSONIC INDUSTRIES 
59 ENG KAH CORPORATIONS BERHAD 
60 LATITUDE TREE HOLDING BERHAD 
61 NAIM HOLDINGS BERHAD (NHB) 
62 MALAYSIA PACIFIC CORPORATION BERHAD 
63 IREKA CORPORATION BERHAD 
64 PASDEC HOLDING BERHAD (PSD) 
65 MAH SING GROUP BERHAD 
66 PARAMOUNT CORPORATION BERHAD'S 
67 MITHRIL BERHAD 
68 PLENITUDE 
69 SYMPHONY IIFE BERHAD (SYML) 
70 TAHBS 
71 YNH PROPERTY BHD 
